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REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by the Plaintiff/Appellant, B. 
R. Woodward Marketing, Inc., to recover commissions earned from 
the Defendants under the terms of a written agreement with the 
Defendants/Respondents. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Upon a hearing held in the lower court before the 
Honorable Judith M. Billings, upon Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the Court held that the Plaintiff had waived 
its right to the commissions provided by the contract and 
further held that there was no genuine dispute as to any of the 
factual issues presented by the holding that Plaintiff had 
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waived such contract rights. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff, B. R. Woodward Marketing, seeks a reversal 
of the summary judgment of the lower court and an order 
remanding this case to the lower court for further proceedings 
including trial, because Plaintiff did not waive his contractual 
right to sales commissions, there are clearly issues of fact 
upon which genuine disputes exist, and Defendant has not clearly 
shown that Plaintiff waived such contractual rights. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff and Defendants executed a Sales 
Representative Agreement on March 16, 1983, prepared by 
Defendants (Woodward Deposition P. 51), which provided in 
Paragraph 3(b) for an incentive commission. (R. 5-10). 
2. At the time of the execution of the Agreement, 
Plaintiff was handling certain previous food purchaser accounts 
which it brought with it as it and such accounts changed sources 
of food distribution to the defendants. (Woodward Depo. at P. 
52, 53, 58). 
3. The parties executed an Amendment to the Agreement 
in June, 1984. (R. 11). 
4. Plaintiff always maintained he was entitled to the 
incentive commission provided by Paragraph 3(b) of the Sales 
Representative Agreement and its officer, Brad Woodward, has so 
testified. (R. 29 and 113 and Woodward Depo. P. 49-50 and 61-
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62). Plaintiff inquired about such commissions and ask when the 
payments were "going to happen". (Woodward Depo. at P. 50). 
5. Plaintiff did not formally request incentive 
commissions under Paragraph 3(b) of the Sales Representative 
Agreement because during the term of the Agreement Defendants 
were having financial trouble. (Woodward Depo. at P. 49-50 and 
62). An employee of Defendants told Plaintiff to wait "until 
things just level out". (Woodward Depo. at P. 50). The tenuous 
financial condition caused Plaintiff to be insecure about its 
new position with Defendants who could cancel its Agreement on 
30 days notice. (R. 9 and Woodward Depo. at P. 49-50). 
6. Following termination of the Sales Representative 
Agreement by Defendants, Plaintiff formally requested payment of 
the incentive commission which Defendants have refused to pay. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence before the Court illustrates clearly that 
several material facts regarding the actions and knowledge of 
the parties are at issue and must be resolved before any 
determination of law can be made. 
Defendants have claimed the defenses of both waiver 
and estoppel but have failed to demonstrate facts before the 
Court which established the necessary elements of either 
doctrine and therefore are not entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THERE ARE VARIOUS GENUINE AND MATERIAL ISSUES OF 
FACT THAT ARE YET TO BE RESOLVED IN THIS CASE. 
Although Defendant has stated in its Respondent's 
Brief that there are no material issues of fact existing in this 
case, several important facts are at issue and must be resolved 
before a determination of law can be made. 
A. Whether Plaintiff Ever Made Demand for the Commissions Owed 
to it is a Fact at Issue. 
Although Defendant claims that demand was never made 
for the commissions it owes to the Plaintiff, there is evidence 
before the Court which indicates that, although formal demand 
was not made, Defendant did have constructive notice of 
Plaintiff's desire to be paid, and this issue of fact must be 
settled before a decision of law can be made. Plaintiff has, by 
affidavit, stated that it reminded officials of Defendant 
Collins about its right to the extra commissions. While 
Defendant in its Respondent's Brief has claimed that this 
creates a conflict with Plaintiff's testimony at deposition, 
Defendant's brief also points out that this is simply not true. 
In response to Defendant's statement at deposition that 
Plaintiff had never made any request for money orally, or in 
writing, Plaintiff's officer Brad Woodward responded, "Other 
than a comment to Craig Hansen. But that was not even a 
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request. It was like, 'what the hell's going on' you know." 
(Woodward Depo. at P. 101); (Respondent's Brief at p.5.). Mr. 
Woodward has also testified by affidavit that Craig Hansen then 
advised him to keep quiet about the money owed to him for the 
time being. 
Craig Hansen was Plaintiff's immediate superior at 
Collins Food Service, Inc. and was the head of the corporation 
in the Salt Lake City area. (Woodward Depo. at P. 24-28 and 32-
34). Mr. Woodward's answers to the above question clearly shows 
that some attempt was made to remind the Defendant of its 
responsibilities under the contract, that no conflict exists 
between Mr. Woodward's deposition and the affidavits presented 
by Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff has not attempted to 
"manufacture" evidence. 
Mr. Woodward's comments also clearly point out that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact to be resolved as to 
whether or not Defendant had constructive and/or actual 
knowledge regarding the monies owed to Plaintiff. 
B. Whether the Defendant Relied on the Alleged Waiver by 
Plaintiff is a Fact of Issue. 
As Defendant has pointed out in its Respondent's 
Brief, whether it relies on the theory of waiver or estoppel it 
must establish that it relied on the actions of Plaintiff as a 
waiver of its rights to commissions. There is no evidence of 
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fact whatsoever before the Court at this time as to whether such 
reliance took place, and the fact therefore remains at issue in 
this case. 
C. Whether Defendant Substantially Changed Positions is a Fact 
at Issue. 
In order for Defendant to prevail on the issues of 
estoppel or waiver, there must be a showing of some type of 
substantial change in position in reliance on the alleged waiver 
or actions of Plaintiff constituting an estoppel. Baggs v. 
Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974). There is no evidence 
of fact before the Court at this time that Defendant 
substantially changed position in any way, other than the bare 
assertion made in its Respondent's Brief that "Collins could 
have made a business decision to terminate Woodward pursuant to 
the thirty day notice period of the contract." (Emphasis added) 
(Respondent's Brief at p.8.) This fact therefore still remains 
at issue in this case. 
D. Whether Defendant Relied to his Detriment is a Fact at 
Issue. 
Any substantial change of position made by Defendant 
in reliance of alleged actions or waiver by Plaintiff, must have 
resulted in some detriment. Id. See also Strouss v. Simmons, 
67 P.2d 1004 (Hawaii 1982). There is no evidence of fact before 
the Court at this time of any such detriment suffered by 
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Defendant, other than the bare assertion in its Respondent's 
Brief that the Defendant gave up the opportunity to terminate 
Plaintiff pursuant to the thirty day notice period of the 
contract* This, as will be pointed out below, resulted in no 
detriment to Defendant and was merely part of its contractual 
relationship with Plaintiff. 
All of the above facts together with those set forth 
in plaintiff's opening brief, do remain at issue in this case 
and are material to the theories upon which Defendant claims it 
should prevail. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT DID NOT 
EXIST, DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Although there remains a number of issues of fact 
which must be resolved in this case, even if said issues of fact 
were not present, Defendant must also prove that it is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Hogan v. Industrial Design 
Corporation. 657 P.2d 751 752 (Utah 1982). 
A. Plaintiff is not Estopped from Claiming Commissions Owed by 
Defendant as a Matter of Law. 
Defendant's entire argument rests on the fact that 
Plaintiff has admitted that it made no formal request for 
payment of the monies owed to it by Defendant. Under Utah law 
however, "mere silence over a period of time will not raise an 
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estoppel where there is no legal or moral duty to speak." 
French v. Johnson, 401 P.2d 315 (Utah 1965). 
Although Defendant has attempted to show that a duty 
to speak existed on the part of Plaintiff, the cases it has 
cited are factually dissimilar and directly contrary to the case 
law found in Utah and to general contract principles. In Bjork 
v. April Industries, Inc., 547 P.2d 219 (Utah 1976), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that, "demand (to enforce an agreement) is 
not necessary where both parties have equal knowledge of the 
contract provision, or where the defaulting party denies the 
obligation." See also 17 Am.Jur. 2d 794, Contracts Sec. 356. 
Defendant may not now be heard to argue that it was not aware of 
the contract provision in question as said contract was drafted 
by Defendant. As both the plaintiff and the Defendant were 
aware of the contract provision providing for the commissions 
due Plaintiff, it was not necessary for Plaintiff to make a 
formal demand of payment to protect its rights. Plaintiff's 
decision to not formally demand payments subject to the contract 
provision, as a result of the recommendation by his direct 
superior in the company, does not estop him from now claiming 
the amounts due to him by contract. 
Even if Plaintiff had made some affirmative action 
upon which to base the theory of estoppel, there was no 
detrimental reliance on the part of Defendant. In Defendant's 
Respondent's Brief it is claimed that if Plaintiff had made 
demand for the commissions owed it under the contract, Defendant 
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could have terminated it upon thirty days notice, therefore it 
"detrimentally relied" on the Plaintiff's silence. 
(Respondent's Brief at p.8). However, there is no evidence 
before this Court that Defendant substantially changed its 
position to its detriment, which is a necessary element of 
estoppel. "This requirement is not satisfied by the mere fact 
that (Defendant) indulged in the pleasant and euphoric 
assumption that he would not have to meet his obligations." 
Baggs Supra at 144. Although Defendant could have given 
Plaintiff notice of termination, any monies paid to Plaintiff 
during its employment were paid pursuant to the contract between 
the parties for work rendered. Defendant was not damaged by 
Plaintiff's continued employment, but received its bargained for 
exchange. 
B. Plaintiff did not Waive his Right to Claim the Additional 
Commissions Under the Contract. 
As was pointed out and supported in Plaintiff's 
initial brief, waiver is the voluntary and intentional 
relinquishment of a known right. Such relinquishment must be 
permanent and, when dealing with a contractual obligation, must 
be in writing and supported by consideration. There can be no 
doubt after reading the testimony of Brad Woodward, an officer 
of the Plaintiff, as set forth before this Court in two 
affidavits and his deposition, that Plaintiff did not waive his 
right to the commissions as provided by the contract. 
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Mr. Woodward stated explicitly that he waited to claim 
the amounts owed to him upon the advice of his immediate 
superior because of the apparent financial problems of the 
Defendant. (Woodward Depo. at P. 49-50 and 62). Such a lack of 
affirmative action cannot imply an intentional and permanent 
waiver, nor were any of the other required elements met. 
Defendant in its Respondent's Brief failed or refused 
to comment on these requirements of waiver, nor did they attempt 
to apply them to the factual situation before the Court. 
Defendant instead chose to compare waiver with the doctrine of 
estoppel, while citing cases that dealt only in estoppel. But, 
as has already been pointed out, the doctrine of estoppel is not 
applicable in this situation. Therefore, Defendant cannot base 
its defense on the doctrine of waiver as it has not provided any 
of the requisite elements. 
CONCLUSION 
There are several genuine issues of fact which must be 
addressed by the parties and decided by a finder of fact before 
any conclusions of law can be made in this case. Each of these 
issues of fact are material to the defenses of waiver and 
estoppel as proffered by the Defendant. Where such issues of 
fact exist, a summary judgment is not proper. 
Even if no issues of fact existed in the case before 
the Court, Defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Defendant has failed to show facts which constitute the 
necessary elements of the doctrines of waiver or estoppel. An 
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estoppel cannot result merely from the silence of an individual 
where there is no duty to speak, and there is no duty in the 
state of Utah to demand compliance of a contractual obligation. 
Defendant has also failed to show facts which indicate that it 
substantially changed position to its detriment while relying on 
the alleged silence of the Plaintiff. 
Defendant has also failed to establish that Plaintiff 
made an intentional and permanent waiver of its contractual 
rights, in writing and supported by consideration, upon which 
Defendant relied. Because each issue before the Court must be 
examined in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant, 
and because the Plaintiff has demonstrated that several material 
issues of fact exist and that Defendant is not entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law, Plaintiff prays this Court reverse 
the decision of the lower court granting summary judgment and 
remand the case for further proceedings and trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / <T^day of July, 1986. 
NEIDER & HUTCHISON 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
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